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Downtown Portland, shown here in 1925, was poorly designed for the automo-
bile age. Its streets were narrow and segmented, and its commercial establish-
ments difficult to reach by auto. Modernization began in the 1960s with the
Model Cities Program, a federal response to the 1960s ghetto riots and the fail-
ure of the urban renewal projects of the previous decade. Model Cities rejected
the “bulldozer” form of renewal in favor of addressing social, as well as physical
problems. Maine Historical Society photo.
 
MODEL CITIES, HOUSING, AND 
RENEWAL POLICY IN 
PORTLAND, MAINE: 1965-1974
BY JOHN F. BAUMAN
Shepherded through Congress by Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, the
1967 Model (or Demonstration) Cities Program was originally intended
for the nation’s large, ghetto-ridden metropolises where it would target a
host of social and economic programs including housing. Thanks to Sen-
ator Muskie, both Portland and Lewiston benefitted. Before the Nixon
Administration scuttled the program in 1973, Portland had created a
host of innovative housing, social welfare, law enforcement, and educa-
tional programs, shifting the city’s urban renewal program away from its
strict emphasis on brick-and-mortar planning. Portland was unique in
making Model Cities a part of its downtown renewal. Energizing the
city’s young historic preservation movement and boosting housing reha-
bilitation efforts, Model Cities played a role in the rise of Portland’s cele-
brated Old Port. John F. Bauman of Southport, Maine, is a Visiting Re-
search Professor at the University of Southern Maine and past-President
of the Society for American City and Regional Planning History. He has
authored or co-authored numerous books including PUBLIC HOUS-
ING, RACE, AND RENEWAL: URBAN PLANNING IN PHILADEL-
PHIA, 1920-1974 (1987) and BEFORE RENAISSANCE: PLANNING
IN PITTSBURGH, 1889-1943 (2006). His history of Portland, Maine
(from which this article derived), will be published by the University of
Massachusetts Press in 2011.
IN 2007, the Society for American City and Regional Planning His-tory met in Portland, Maine. As part of that meeting, confereestoured Portland’s sparkling “Old Port,” its stunning historical dis-
tricts, Congress and Monument Squares, and its gleaming banking cen-
ter and plazas with open-air restaurants. The conference included a ses-
sion on Model Cities, a federal program created in the mid-1960s in
response to the failures of the urban renewal projects of the previous
decade. The session featured many of the participants who drafted and
executed Portland’s 1967 Model Cities Program, including Don Nicoll, a
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legislative aide who oversaw Senator Edmund Muskie’s input into the
creation of the Model Cities Program. All agreed that Model Cities had
profoundly impacted the city, playing a key role in its downtown renais-
sance.
Viewed historically, this verdict on Portland’s Model Cities Program
might seem incongruous. Many scholars have viewed Model Cities as a
failure. The federal legislation, at first hailed as enlightened, was tragi-
cally diluted as the war in Vietnam took its fiscal toll on President Lyn-
don B. Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. Praised for dictating maxi-
mum “citizen participation,” it was ultimately condemned for its
“maximum citizen manipulation.” Moreover, Model Cities, which
emerged in response to the 1960s summer riots in the black ghettoes of
large cities such as Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit, made little Port-
land a seemingly inappropriate venue. Finally, and critical for this study,
Model Cities reputedly rejected the bricks-and-mortar “bulldozer” re-
newal in favor of manpower training, education, and healthcare upgrad-
ing; it was, in short, a form of social, not physical renewal. Portland,
however, wove Model Cities into the very fabric of its bricks and mortar
revitalization program. It made Model Cities the handmaiden of urban
renewal.1
Because of the racially explosive context of Model Cities, scholars
have mainly, and understandably, focused on the shortcomings of the
program’s citizen participation provisions and its underfunded initia-
tives.2 Little attention has been given to the program’s novel stress on in-
tegrating physical with social urban development goals. While Model
Cities stressed human capital and social rebuilding, it hardly abjured ur-
ban physical renewal. Model Cities budgets brimmed with line items for
housing development, medical and recreational facilities, new schools,
and street improvements. The Demonstration Cities Program – later
Model Cities – prescribed mobilizing all the tools of planning and urban
development, public and private, state and federal, toward the goal of ef-
fective city-building. Presumably, neighborhoods enriched by better
housing, sanitation, health, legal, educational, and job-training services
(or “gilded” to use a pejorative term bandied about in the late 1960s and
1970s), and empowered by citizen involvement in decision-making,
would stanch the outflow of population and tax dollars and restore
health to the urban body politic.3
Like Providence, Rhode Island, and other small New England cities
that in the nineteenth century developed industrial economies, in the
mid-twentieth century Portland felt trapped in a long cycle of deindus-
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trialization and plagued with aging housing and infrastructure. Once,
prior to 1923, an important port linking America, Europe, and Canada,
by the mid-1960s Portland struggled to redefine itself commercially.
Portland had boomed during World War II as a center for shipbuilding
and a staging site for trans-Atlantic convoys. Portland shipped over
100,000 tons annually during the war, but ocean-going tonnage dipped
to 50,000 tons in 1955 and plunged to a mere 10,000 in 1960. In 1962 the
Canadian Grand Trunk Railway, which since 1855 had dominated the
railroad and wintertime grain-trans-shipment economy of Portland,
sold its grain elevator and eight eastern wharves to the city. The sale
opened the waterfront to potential redevelopment, but for what?4
As in other cities, city planning officials and business leaders ago-
nized over the lagging pace of postwar urban renewal and its legacy of
ugly rubble-strewn lots marked off by white wooden fences. Portland’s
“renewed” Bayside neighborhood in 1965 sat bulldozed and fallow,
while residents of aging urban neighborhoods on the western end of the
peninsula complained of poor schools, high crime rates, unemploy-
ment, poverty, and substandard housing.5 Economic decline, especially
the waning waterfront activity, brought a 6.5 percent decline in the city’s
population, from 78,000 in 1950 to 72,566 in 1960. Over the next decade
it dropped another 10.4 percent to 65,000. A few signs of hope flickered.
An oil pipeline from South Portland to Montreal renewed the economic
link to Canada, and the Portland Chamber of Commerce took heart that
the city in 1965 still reigned supreme as a center of finance, trade, and
distribution for all of Maine. The state’s four largest banks called Port-
land home, as did its largest insurance company. Still, John Menario, the
young, Portland-born, University of Pennsylvania Fels School graduate
who became city manager in 1967, found the city dreary and forlorn
upon his return home, its narrow, dark downtown streets unwelcoming
and inhospitable. While the city resisted the term “depressed,” a sluggish
post-industrial economy and the challenge of suburbia – especially the
proposed Maine Mall on the city’s doorstep – fully mobilized city busi-
nessmen behind downtown renewal.6
Portland launched its urban renewal movement as early as 1947 and
created a Slum Clearance and Renewal Authority in 1952. By 1965 the
Portland Planning Department’s map displayed five renewal project ar-
eas on the peninsula. The Vine-Deering-Chatham project had been
completed, and demolition and plans for public housing moved forward
at Bayside Park and Munjoy South, the latter a large, aging neighbor-
hood on the eastern periphery of downtown. But residents and small
Model Cities 
businesses there complained about the human cost of massive demoli-
tion plans and the inadequacy of relocation efforts.7 Like other cities,
Portland failed to lure private investors into “de-slummed” tracts like
Bayside, and these projects left deep scars on the urban landscape. Port-
land’s downtown, like main streets nationwide, still teetered financially.
Fearing imminent competition from a large shopping mall rising in sub-
urban South Portland, the city’s major department stores, Porteous,
Mitchell, & Braun, and Benoits, with the Casco Bank and other busi-
nesses, threatened departure.
These threats only stiffened the Portland Redevelopment Authority’s
resolve. In 1965 the chair of PRA, James H. Burke, proclaimed that the
“day of the bulldozer is rapidly coming to a close.” He saw the “ugly
wounds in the urban landscape . . . being healed” and “new and exciting
forms of steel and stone . . . rearing their triumphant heads against the
city skies.” Thrilled by urban modernism, Burke saw “glad tidings” in the
new cityscapes unfolding in downtown Philadelphia, Baltimore, St.
Louis, and New Haven.8 Burke never dissembled about the priority of
downtown over neighborhood renewal. Clearing slums was important,
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Portland in the 1960s, like many once-industrialized cities, was slipping into de-
cline, its urban renewal projects having failed to attract new business and many
of its downtown buildings standing empty. Among the few signs of hope was an
oil pipeline from South Portland to Montreal, which renewed the port city’s
longstanding economic link to Canada. Maine Historical Society photo.
 
but relocating uprooted families proved costly and problematic, despite
federal assistance. On the contrary, Portland officials viewed downtown
renewal (for which the federal government covered two-thirds of the
cost) as a crucial investment, adding vital ratables to a sagging tax base.
Without renewal, Burke warned, “the downtown will fall, like an out-
grown lobster shell to the bottom of the sea.” He cautioned that urban
renewal could be divisive, pitting rich businessmen against less affluent
neighborhood residents. “Whatever the local Chamber of Commerce
wants is automatically denounced as merely another grasp for goodies
for their ever enlarging gravy train,” he warned, but the city had to “take
on a new personality.” He saw a revitalized downtown as the basis for a
“shared ... good life.”9
Gruen to the Rescue
It was in this light, then, that the city Chamber of Commerce in 1964
joined with city officials to hire the modernist architect-planner and
mall designer Victor Gruen. They in turn consulted with the Portland
Planning Department and Spencer M. Hurtt Associates to develop a
General Neighborhood Renewal Plan for the downtown area. Gruen’s fi-
nal report, however, bore the “Mall Makers” indelible imprint. Portland
planners in 1965 defined the downtown as the area of the peninsula
bounded by Cumberland Street on the north, Fore Street on the south,
Pearl to the east, and State Street on the West. Gruen’s September 1966
report, “Downtown Portland, Maine: General Neighborhood Renewal
Plan,” fit the Vienna-born planner’s standard model for diagnosing ur-
ban ills. Portland, stated the report, suffered from three main problems:
bad housing, bad streets, and bad parking. The 1960 census had found
28.8 percent of downtown housing stock to be substandard. The city en-
dured horrid traffic circulation patterns, and its streets proved narrow
and discontinuous. The city’s on-street parking rendered it inhospitable
to modern automobility. By eliminating dingy rooming houses, single-
room occupancy hotels, and other shabby downtown housing, designers
could build a ring-road traffic circulation system bordered by strategi-
cally located parking garages. Moreover, by adding a million square feet
of retail and office space, 280 new hotel units, and 316,000 square feet of
state, local, and federal office space, Gruen would remake Portland’s
shabby downtown into the scintillating, pulsating heart of the city. He
would transform it into a desirable, mall-like place.
To make Portland again the heart of the region’s civic, cultural, and
recreational life, Gruen proposed a civic center complex with concert
hall, theaters, art galleries, and convention space. To facilitate access to
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the downtown Gruen proposed to widen Franklin Street, a narrow,
densely populated, tree-lined residential street bisecting the Bayside
neighborhood, into a wide, four-lane divided central artery looping off
the proposed I-295 extension, and thus, as long envisioned, to connect
Portland directly to the Maine Turnpike. For the future Gruen recom-
mended converting the Forrest City’s spacious ocean front and pier-
lined Commercial Street into a super highway, speeding turnpike traffic
directly into the heart of the city.10
Gruen, in his defense, recognized Portland’s eighteenth- and nine-
teenth–century architecture as an asset, especially the historic architec-
ture along Congress Street, the so-called spine of the peninsula. Con-
gress Street boasted the revered birthplace of Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow as well as Congress and Monument Squares, and other his-
toric districts were located just off Congress Street on Park, High, Dan-
forth, State, and Spring streets. As he did in his Fort Worth, Texas, Plan
(which was never realized), Gruen proposed converting the city’s main
shopping district, Congress between Pearl and High streets — the heart
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Edmund S. Muskie, elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958, took a keen interest in
poverty, housing, and urban redevelopment. In 1966 President Lyndon Johnson
asked Muskie to shepherd a Model Cities bill through the Senate, and when it
passed, Johnson rewarded Muskie by promising that Portland would be one of
the cities chosen to implement the program. Photo courtesy of the Edmund S.
Muskie Archives and Special Collections Library.
 
of the downtown, and the site of Portland’s principal banks and the
Benoit and Porteous and Mitchell department stores — into a pedes-
trian mall.11
Gruen’s Portland plan, although never completed, left an enduring
imprint on the city. At first using city and state, rather than federal
funds, Portland acted immediately to widen Franklin Street and turn
Spring Street into part of Gruen’s envisioned downtown expressway
loop, complete with the Spring Street parking garage. In 1967 Portland
applied for a multi-million dollar grant to undertake the “Downtown
Two” project, which included Gruen’s Congress Street banking and retail
center. This in 1969 became the Maine-Way project. Significantly, it
neatly dovetailed with Portland’s 1967 Model Cities Program, meant to
make Portland’s “Renaissance” as much about beautifying the city’s de-
teriorating social environment as about restoring the city’s material ap-
pearance.12
Muskie and Portland’s Model City
Portland’s Model Cities Program owed an enormous debt to Maine’s
distinguished senator, Edmund Muskie. Born in Rumford, educated at
Bates College and Cornell Law School, and a World War II veteran,
Muskie practiced law in Waterville and was elected a state legislator in
1946. He became Maine’s first Democratic governor in a generation in
1954 and moved on to the U.S. Senate in 1958. Lyndon B. Johnson ini-
tially relegated Muskie to seats on the Subcommittee on Intergovern-
mental Relations and the Banking and Currency Committee. Muskie
deftly used his effectiveness on these committees to chart a highly suc-
cessful senatorial career. Known for his work on water and air quality is-
sues, Muskie, like Republican Margaret Chase Smith, took an equally
keen interest in poverty, housing, and urban redevelopment. In 1966
President Johnson tapped Muskie to manage his new Model Cities legis-
lation. The “Demonstration Cities” legislation, as it was drafted and pre-
sented to Congress, initially called for a mere handful of cities to partici-
pate, but as his reward for shepherding the bill, Muskie negotiated
Johnson’s promise that Portland would be one of those cities, its size
notwithstanding.13
Demonstration Cities faced hurdles. Many in Congress questioned
the title itself, believing, as Alabama’s John Sparkman put it, that the
word “demonstration” conjured up ugly, frightening images of young,
long-haired radicals and fiery urban riots. Southerners objected to the
law’s language barring segregation in low-cost housing built in Model
Model Cities 
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City neighborhoods. Muskie used Post Office Department money to fly
key architects, including Joseph Califano, Larry O’Brien, and Milton Se-
mer, to Kennebunk Beach, Maine, where he owned a summer home.
Muskie’s wife, Jane, served a steaming lobster stew, and in the wake of
the feast the final legislation was drafted.14
Jane Muskie’s lobster stew altered the legislation little from the origi-
nal form. To placate Senator Sparkman, Muskie and his colleagues sub-
stituted the words “afford maximum opportunity of choice of housing
accommodations” for the more liberal language proscribing segregation.
Although the official title remained intact, the group adopted Model
Cities as the popular name for a program which, rather than spotlighting
large cities, now encompassed sixty-six medium-sized towns. Muskie
also insisted that the legislation emphasize novel and imaginative hous-
ing and renewal programs, and, crucial for Portland, a city poised for re-
newal amidst a rich architectural heritage, stipulated that surveys of his-
toric resources and efforts at historic preservation accompany any
proposal for slum clearance or housing rehabilitation. Outrage over the
1961 demolition of Portland’s chateauesque Union Station (1888)
spawned an historic preservation movement that in 1964 sired Greater
Portland Landmarks. With passage of the National Historic Preservation
Act of 1966 and the creation of the National Register of Historic Places,
the Maine senator ardently supported historic preservation. Muskie’s ac-
tion assured that Model Cities funds would be used, typically with
matching private funds, to rehabilitate run-down but historically impor-
tant inner city buildings. Cities initially applied for planning funds, and
those favored applied for supplemental monies for the all-important
five-year action phase.15
Once a fiscally conservative Yankee Republican city that fiercely resis-
ted federal programs such as public housing, Portland rallied behind the
Model Cities Program. In 1967 it had a more progressive, more activist,
and more ethnically diverse City Council, led by people such as the Irish
bricklayer’s son, corporate counsel, and stalwart Democrat Harold Lor-
ing. Loring and Portland’s new city manager, John Menario, showered
expressions of gratitude upon Senators Muskie and Smith for their ef-
forts in assuring that Portland was on the approved list for the Model
Cities Program.16 On November 11, 1967, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment(HUD) Secretary Robert Weaver announced that Portland had
been selected for a planning grant of $1,834,000 to develop its Model
Cities Program. Ultimately, the city received $7,594, 429 in Model Cities
monies, but combined this with funds from other federal agencies to
 
draw into Portland more than $31 million. Unlike Portland’s Office of
Economic Opportunity (Portland Regional Opportunity Program or
PROP), where local citizens participated in policy decisions and the dis-
position of federal funds, Model Cities monies went directly to the City
Council. The Council selected a Model Cities Director, Robert Hawkins,
who reported to City Manager Menario. Closely supervised by Hawkins
and the City Council and under the watchful eye of Muskie and his aide,
Don Nicoll, Portland launched its Model Cities planning process.
Model Cities represented a revolutionary new form of federalism. In
this instance the federal government stripped away burdensome layers of
red tape that had frustrated urban renewal programs in the 1950s and
shepherded recalcitrant, overly bureaucratic federal agencies such as the
Office of Economic Opportunity, Health, Education, and Welfare, and
Housing and Urban Development behind a unified solution to urban
problems.17 The Forest City’s chosen Model Neighborhood was called
“Portland West,” an area that, in the words of the application, included
“virtually the entire western end of the [Falmouth] peninsula, plus an
area of considerable blight adjacent to it immediately north of the cen-
tral business district.” Portland West embraced as well a crucial segment
of the city’s waterfront, rich in historical architecture, and the city’s
Frederick Law Olmsted-designed Western Promenade.18
The City Council designated the Portland West Advisory Committee
(PWAC) as the local Model Cities neighborhood agency. However, most
of the real “citizen participation” took place in seven, thirty-person task
forces empowered to hold hearings, accumulate evidence, deliberate, and
formulate first “Statements of Condition” and secondly “Recommended
Solutions” for what were identified as Portland West’s key problems:
housing, health, education, employment and economic development,
recreation, crime and juvenile delinquency, and social services. While
Model Cities literature insisted that it was “a people program,” the publi-
cations muted the role of “slum clearance”; in truth the city assigned a
high priority to Portland West’s physical revitalization. Indeed, Port-
land’s successful 1967 request for a planning grant stated explicitly that
“the City primarily sought to improve the quality of housing” in Port-
land West, in addition to providing relocation services, improved public
facilities, and an attractive neighborhood.19
All of these goals were considered vital to a renewed downtown – a
downtown literally surrounded by Portland West. Muskie’s Senate Bank-
ing and Currency Committee exercised legislative responsibility for ur-
ban renewal, and Muskie in the early 1960s fretted that 1950s-style ur-
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ban renewal had been growing day by day more unpopular, attacked
from the right and the left. Without prompt action his state might fail to
benefit from federal largess. Portland stood poised for both waterfront
and downtown renewal, and as an advocate of comprehensive, coordi-
nated urban renewal, Muskie saw Model Cities as the instrument for a
more effective, integrated, and humane solution to urban blight.20
Not coincidentally, then, when Howard Heller, Executive Director of
the Portland Renewal Authority (PRA), submitted the city’s planning
grant for “Downtown Two (to be funded by HUD’s General Neighbor-
hood Renewal Plan [GNRP]),” he emphasized that Downtown Two and
Model Cities were dovetailed. “The appropriateness of these [housing]
programs,” he wrote, “has been predicated on “the assumption that
downtown would be renewed and new employment opportunities
would be created in this area.”21 Downtown Two mainly involved the
“environmental upgrading” and retention of large, established city busi-
ness houses, A.H. Benoit’s and the Porteous and Mitchell department
stores, the Casco Bay and Canal banks, and the Union Mutual Insurance
Company. Since HUD favored expansion of housing supply over busi-
ness buildings, it initially rated Portland’s Downtown Two project low.
Consequently, Portland endeavored to dovetail its Downtown and
Model Cities programs. The Gruen plan had projected that by providing
downtown access and modern parking facilities for Sears and Roebuck,
Benoits, Porteous and Mitchell, Woolworths, Grants, and the city’s
banking offices, renewal would add 300 new downtown jobs. Model
Cities provided vocational training, new and rehabilitated housing, and
enhanced quality of life for this workforce. Portland, in fact, had specifi-
cally tailored its renewal to meet the national goal of conservation and
housing expansion, contending that downtown would become a district
of job opportunity and Portland West a Mecca for good housing. Appli-
cations for Model Cities and GNRP grants, therefore, were developed
jointly.22 In an explanatory letter to HUD’s Renewal Assistance Adminis-
trator Charles Horan, Heller minced few words in exhorting the human
aspects of Downtown Two. Hundreds of jobs, he argued, hinged on
Portland not losing employers like Union Mutual, Benoits, and Canal
Bank. “I would like to point out that our Model Cities Program, which
encompasses the area immediately adjacent to the Downtown, has been
designed to supplement downtown renewal. Without Downtown re-
newal, it seems doubtful that the adjacent Model Cities neighborhood
can be revitalized.”23
In fall 1967 the presidents of almost every major downtown firm 
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A good part of the Model Cities effort went into physical reconstruction of
Portland’s downtown, a project that mobilized a wide range of federal, state,
and local resources. Model Cities dollars not only underwrote a key Greater
Portland Landmarks historic resources study, but they funded a Housing Infor-
mation Service, along with sewer, sidewalk, and street lighting repairs, traffic
control studies, spot demolition, and a program titled simply “Urban Beautifi-
cation.” Maine Historical Society photo.
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beseeched HUD to fund Downtown Two in tandem with Model Cities.
Arthur Benoit, whose store sat prominently on Monument Square,
“couldn’t remember when there was quite as much team work within the
community on any project as there is with regards to this. . . . There was
never a more clear case of urgency for anything than that facing Portland
for the next three years. We just cannot hope to survive in the classic
sense of the city unless we receive the Renewal Funds.”24 As Portland’s
Task Forces held hearings, carried out research, and compiled data to de-
fine Portland West’s employment, housing, education, health, crime, and
recreation problems and sculpted a Model Cities Program, the City
Council and the City Planning Department focused on identifying the
crucial nexus between urban renewal and human renewal. Meeting with
city business leaders, Muskie reiterated the new social emphasis of HUD:
“the agency would look especially favorably,” he told them, “at Portland’s
[downtown] urban renewal program as it related to the ‘people problem’
of the Model Cities.”25
Muskie’s words resonated with Model Cities’ planners, and by 1969
Portland had moved from the planning stage of the Model Cities Pro-
gram into the “First Year Action” phase, and clearly the city now saw
Model Cities’ various segments — housing, job training, health services,
policing, and historic preservation — tightly linked to the future of the
downtown. Indeed, by 1972, when Downtown Two, now called the
Maine Way project, was well underway, the Annual Report of the Port-
land Renewal Authority wove the two HUD programs together seam-
lessly. Clearing blight and re-housing Portland West benefitted the
downtown area.26
However, to label Portland West “blighted” surely stretched the defi-
nition of that word. The eight neighborhoods, an assemblage of old
“streetcar suburbs” ringing most of the city’s downtown, had become
“planning districts”: the West End, Bramhall, Mellen, Bayside West, Con-
gress, Clark, Park, and Commercial. They included the magnificent
Colonial Revival mansions overlooking the Fore River on the Western
Promenade, the exquisite collection of John Calvin Stevens “Shingle
Style” architecture on Bowdoin Street, and attractive Queen Anne-Style
triple-deckers in the Park District. Other neighborhoods in the Model
Cities district contained rich collections of early Federal and ornate Vic-
torian treasures.27 However, parts of Bayside and the West End also har-
bored seedy rooming houses and ramshackle hovels. Portland’s director
of Model Cities, Robert Hawkins, the PWAC, and Task Force members
charged with drafting the city’s First Year Action Plan acknowledged this
 
diversity of conditions. They portrayed the area’s “threatened” historic
landmarks, underscored the 2,700 dwelling units branded as “deterio-
rated” in the 1960 census, and stressed that Portland suffered from a se-
vere shortage of decent affordable housing. But poor housing, along
with the West End’s failing schools, its dearth of recreational facilities,
and its poor mental health care, were all symptomatic of the real prob-
lem: low income. Poverty, argued Hawkins and the other authors of the
action plan, was “the real specter which forever haunt[ed] the Portland
West community. . . . Forty-one percent of its children suffered from
hard-core poverty.” Hopelessness and defeatism accompanied poverty;
here lived an older, more transient, undereducated, under-served popu-
lation to be reintegrated into the social and economic orbit of Portland’s
urban life by rebuilding the social and physical fabric of the Model City.
Indeed, since Portland West comprised most of the peninsula minus the
central business district, and since the downtown waited for funding un-
der the General Neighborhood Renewal Program, rejuvenating the West
End heralded an urban renaissance.28
That renaissance hopefully neared when on December 13, 1968,
Robert Hawkins, on behalf of the City of Portland, applied to HUD for a
$1,834,004 supplemental grant to execute “a Comprehensive City Devel-
opment Plan Including the First Year Action Program for the year 1969.”
It was a massive and impressive document, rich in statistics, laden with
analysis, and programmatically innovative.29 In conformance with HUD
guidelines, the plan detailed Portland West’s problems — alcoholism,
crime, juvenile delinquency, joblessness, poor health, poor education,
and shabby or non-existent social services — and described projects to
remedy them. Social programs to “break the pattern of poverty,” give
“access to opportunity,” “ensure dignity,” “increase purchasing power,”
and afford “choice” loomed large. The plan mobilized the scattered re-
sources of HUD, OEO, HEW, Department of Labor, and state, local and
private agencies to flood Portland West with new programs, including a
Model (experimental) Elementary School (Rosa True), area vocational
education, adult education, Head Start, a model police unit, and a half-
way house for alcoholics. Many of these programs fit the conventional
Johnson-era “War on Poverty” mold, but some did not. Portland’s boldly
innovative “income-maintenance” proposal, a $200,000 item to use as
“child allotments,” resembled the Family Assistance Plan Daniel P.
Moynihan proposed to the Richard Nixon administration several years
later. That idea was rejected by the City Council, but other programs,
such as Pharos House to combat criminal recidivism, a neighborhood
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By the time the Nixon administration pulled the plug on the Model Cities Pro-
gram, the Portland renaissance had been launched, with a new eleven-story
Canal Bank Building facing a sparkling Monument Square, with other skyscrap-
ers nearby on Congress Street. Maine Historical Society photo.
The Model Cities Program left
much to be desired in the way of
new housing, but it achieved a
great deal in downtown renewal.
Among its successes was the trans-
formation of Franklin Street, pic-
tured here in 1950 as a narrow,
tree-lined residential street, into a
wide, four-lane divided artery
looping off the proposed I-295 ex-
tension and thus connecting Port-
land directly with the Maine Turn-
pike. Maine Historical Society
photo.
class in classical music appreciation, a drug store cooperative, and
COMBAT (Consumers in Maine Bring Action Together), despite their
radical tinge, won council approval.30
As much as Portland West sought to overcome the area’s poverty and
kindle hope, the plan, confessed its authors, would fail if neighbors used
their newfound power of choice to relocate to the newer, grassy suburbs.
Thus, Portland West’s leadership viewed the redemption of the neigh-
borhood’s physical space on a par with the revitalization of its social and
economic life.
Model Cities and Neighborhood Renewal
Keyed as it was to the city’s broader strategy of downtown renewal,
physical (bricks and mortar) development naturally ranked high among
Portland’s Model Cities goals. The city aspired to restore Bramhall,
Mellen, Park, and the other five neighborhoods of Portland West to their
nineteenth-century respectability. In fact, one of those neighborhoods,
the Western Promenade, crowned by an Olmsted-designed park featur-
ing a distant vista of Mount Washington, had long housed the city’s eco-
nomic elite. To adequately serve a newly-expanded downtown work-
force, these neighborhoods would have to feature not only clean, safe
streets, but also good schools and most of all plentiful affordable hous-
ing. Task Force studies conducted jointly by the city’s Housing Inspec-
tion Department, the Housing Task Force, and Portland Landmarks sin-
gled out structures “historically, aesthetically, or architecturally worthy
of preservation.” Those less distinguished were deemed “eligible for fed-
eral renewal, rehabilitation, redevelopment and code enforcement” ac-
tion, or even demolition.31
Age, disinvestment and decay had taken its toll on Portland West, de-
spite the proximity of such valuable neighborhood assets as the man-
sion-studded Western Promenade. Raw waste from Portland West
neighborhoods spilled into Portland Harbor. Broken street lamps and
irregular garbage collection bequeathed dark, dangerous, and malodor-
ous walkways. Too many area residents lived “below any minimum stan-
dard of existence which our society should tolerate.” The 1968 Action
Plan summoned Portland West to become “a balanced [innovative] mix-
ture of uses, [residential] structure types, and open space . . . that meet
the highest standard of urban design that preserves the classic character
and charm of our present city.” Planning, it added, “must be coordinated
with . . . other aspects of the Model City Program, and other city pro-
grams within Portland West must be coordinated with the physical plan-
ning effort.”32
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For this physical reconstruction phase, Portland West mobilized a
bevy of federal, state and local public as well as private resources, includ-
ing the Chamber of Commerce, the Maine State Savings Bank, the Ur-
ban Renewal Administration, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), city code enforcement, Portland Public Works, and the sanita-
tion, and city planning departments. Using Model Cities’ funds, the city
created a new Portland Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment. True to HUD’s mandate for comprehensiveness, Portland
Model Cities dollars not only underwrote a key Greater Portland Land-
marks historic resources study, but a Housing Information Service along
with sewer, sidewalk, and street lighting repairs, traffic control studies,
spot demolition, and a program titled simply “Urban Beautification.”
All of this physical development complemented Portland’s effort to
make Model Cities a key part of the city’s larger downtown renewal. A
$324,000 budget item identified as “Neighborhood Development Pro-
gram,” targeted for Portland West housing and rehabilitation work,
stood out as the city’s single largest Model Cities fiscal year 1969 expen-
diture, followed by the $94,000 budgeted for “Urban Beautification.”
However, in order to bar Model Cities from intruding upon HUD’s on-
going housing development agenda, Congress prohibited Model Cities
from directly using supplemental funds for new housing construction.
Instead it limited all Model Cities new housing funds to “innovative” or
“experimental” programs, a requirement that ultimately proved highly
constraining.33
Experiments in Housing
Since 1937 federal housing administrators had always encouraged
innovation in housing design hoping to employ technology to solve the
problem of delivering affordable mass housing. In the 1940s, for exam-
ple, Buckminster Fuller had proposed that FHA utilize geodesic domes
as an affordable housing design. In 1968 Portland’s Housing Task Force
enthusiastically seized upon the idea of an “Experimental Housing Pro-
gram,” and, according to City Manager Menario, “indicated a deep desire
that [the city] standards be high quality housing designed with relevance
for inner-city housing and middle-income residents.”34 The City’s
Chamber of Commerce perceived experimental housing as an ideal re-
use for Portland’s aging and abandoned piers, moldering from long dis-
use on the western waterfront. City officials creatively included this wa-
terfront infrastructure as part of the Portland West neighborhood.
Obsessed as he was with both contemporary architecture and mod-
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ern systems theory, Model Cities administrator Hawkins extolled the
Westinghouse Corporation’s proposals for space age, modular housing
designs, especially one for “Air Rights Housing” built on stilts, which
seemed ideal for the unused city piers. Portland included the “Air Rights
Housing” in its 1968 Model Cities application for supplemental funds,
and although the idea never advanced beyond the fantasy stage, the city
featured an architectural rendition of “Air Rights Housing” on the cover
of its 1975 Model Cities final report.35
More realistic was the Chamber of Commerce’s sponsorship of Port-
land Housing Opportunities, Inc., a non-profit, limited-dividend corpo-
ration formed to build innovative affordable rental and private housing.
Much of this would be located on space freed by Title I (of the 1949
Housing Act) slum clearance activity. Housing Opportunities (HO)
functioned as a site developer working with local, state, and federal
agencies to navigate the permitting process and expedite the construc-
tion of HUD-subsidized private housing and assisted rental housing.
HO proposed construction of 105 high-rise housing units for low and
moderate income families, whereas at Dermot Court the company em-
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Thanks in no small part to the Model Cities Program, Portland learned to em-
brace historic preservation as a planning tool. This in turn smoothed the way
for the reconstruction of the city’s threadbare waterfront district. The Old Port
Exchange was designed to be an urban festival marketplace similar to Ghi-
rardelli Square in San Francisco and Quincy Market in Boston. Maine Historical
Society photo.
 
ployed an experimental modular design for sixteen low-rise, homeown-
ersip units.36
Edmund Muskie had long supported rent supplements, limited-div-
idend housing, and other private-market solutions to the low and mod-
erate income housing supply problem, and he exuded considerable en-
thusiasm for Portland’s Housing Opportunities, Inc., as an experimental
program. Nevertheless, Portland’s Final Report on Model Cities deemed
the innovative program a failure. While it did build Dermot Court,
Housing Opportunities’ plans for a much needed 105-unit, eleven-story
high rise never left the architect’s drawing board, and the non-profit
housing firm permanently folded in June 1973.37
Appraising the successes and failures of Model Cities in 1975, both
Portland West officials and Task Force members concluded that bureau-
cratic inertia and the rising cost of homebuilding in the early 1970s
doomed any housing innovation and experimentation. Much of the en-
thusiasm for Air Rights housing and modular construction fizzled dur-
ing the half-year delay between grant approval in late 1968 and the ac-
tual receipt of funds in June 1969, a delay mainly caused by the Nixon
administration’s demand that all Model Cities grants be scrutinized to
excise the fat. The City Council then continued the procrastination, first
by stripping away the income-maintenance provision and then tempo-
rizing endlessly over funding experimental housing. Meanwhile, the
Portland Building Inspection Department proved reluctant to grant
variances to the city’s zoning and buildings codes, especially its mini-
mum lot size.38 What housing innovation survived succumbed during
the fourth and fifth years of Model Cities in 1972-1973, when, with ru-
mors of scandals rife, the federal Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) declared a moratorium on all subsidized housing programs. 39
Despite the travail, Housing Opportunities stimulated interest in
subsidized housing, and during a national housing slowdown, caused in
part by rising interest rates, 170 units of FHA-subsidized turnkey and
leased public housing arose in Portland West, mainly as infill units. This,
however, was barely half of what the PWAC demanded. The Nixon ad-
ministration’s moratorium also affected housing rehabilitation, the most
successful Model Cities housing program in Portland West. Thanks in
large part to the city’s MICAH housing program, Model Cities blanketed
Portland West with rehabilitation loans. Non-profit, non-denomina-
tional, MICAH (a play on the Biblical Micah and an acronym for Metro-
politan Council on Affordable Housing) effectively made rehabilitation
the chief vehicle for better housing in the district, and in effect, pre-
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served Portland’s nineteenth-century housing stock, making the city’s
West End again a more fashionable address.
MICAH, Inc., in fact, operated to make housing rehabilitation a vi-
able alternative to new construction and neighborhood conservation.
Over the five-year life of Model Cities funding, from 1969 to 1973,
MICAH received $672,000 in grants, $550,000 of which went directly to
low and moderate income homeowners, and generated over $1.25 mil-
lion in rehabilitation activity. MICAH coordinated with city housing in-
spectors and intensified code enforcement in the Portland West neigh-
borhood. Grants funded by both Model Cities and FHA allowed owners
of substandard, nineteenth-century housing to correct major interior
and exterior code violations. A vital part of MICAH’s work involved
purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling or renting deteriorated residential
structures, often originally held by absentee owners. This profitable ven-
ture made MICAH a self-sufficient, non-profit corporation that also be-
came a housing advocacy body, assisting many families to become
homeowners. In 1973 MICAH in addition controlled 106 units of reha-
bilitated for-rent homes in the Danforth Street neighborhood. However,
OMB’s impoundment of HUD rehabilitation loan monies in 1973 —
later ruled illegal — crippled MICAH and other housing conservation
work in Portland.40
Portland West’s checkered experience with citizen participation and
its disappointing experimental housing record aside, the program’s ac-
complishments in housing rehabilitation, historic preservation, neigh-
borhood beautification, and neighborhood education were significant.
In addition, its highly-praised Model Police Station, half way houses,
Youth Opportunity, and day care centers more than warranted the en-
comiums accorded the program. Understandably, then, Portland decried
the Nixon cutbacks in Model Cities funding. Washington’s evisceration
of Model Cities brought the program to a halt in 1974 when the city re-
ceived its last Model Cities supplemental payment, barely half of what
was due.41
But Portland West’s success must be measured in the broader con-
text of downtown renewal. Maine Way, the signature downtown renais-
sance project that began as Downtown Two, surged at the very moment
Nixon pulled the plug on Model Cities. The $13 million project, ap-
proved by HUD in 1972, remade the face of Portland’s downtown. By
the 1980s, Maine Way featured a new eleven-story Canal Bank Building
facing a sparkling Monument Square, a shimmering Maine Savings
Bank skyscraper nearby on Congress Street, and the bench-and tree-
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lined pedestrian mall linking the Old Port with Portland’s business and
banking center on Congress Street. On widened Spring Street stood the
Cumberland County Civic Center, first proposed by Victor Gruen in the
1960s, along with his ring-road position parking garages. The whole as-
semblage was accessed by the Franklin Arterial and one-way traffic on
High and State Street.42
Thanks in no small part to the Model Cities Program, Portland soon
came to embrace historic preservation as a premier planning tool.
Greater Portland Landmarks used its Model Cities grant to alert Port-
land to its underappreciated historic resources and to make history a ve-
hicle for resurrecting the city’s sagging, but once critically important
tourist economy. Thanks to Model Cities, Portland came to appreciate
rehabilitation more than demolition as a planning tool.43
Amidst Model Cities and the early Downtown Two, Frank Akers,
president of a central city brass castings firm forced to relocate due to
the widening of Spring Street, purchased an old brick building at Fore
and Exchange streets, at the heart of the grimy “Old Port” district. Aware
of the successful urban festival marketplaces at Ghirardelli Square in San
Francisco and Faneuil Hall in Boston, Akers saw potential in Old Port’s
quaint, narrow, serpentine streets and its four- and five-story nine-
teenth-century commercial buildings, many of them endowed with
striking Italianate bracketed cornices, Queen-Ann bays, and other Victo-
rian architrave. In the face of city plans to demolish parts of the Old Port
area, Akers joined with other intrigued neighborhood businessmen to
form the Old Port Exchange Association. Akers and his associates pur-
chased several whole blocks of the gritty district adjoining the Commer-
cial Street wharves and proceeded to promote the idea of the Old Port as
Portland’s own festival marketplace.44
Portland’s Maine Way and the subsequent Old Port development in
some ways restored the city’s nineteenth-century legacy as the “Gateway
to Vacationland.” Although Congress Street still battles to recapture the
glamour and vibrancy of its youth, and while the Bayside Neighborhood
still awaits a developer to crown its half-century of renewal promises,
most modern urban critics regard the Portland urban peninsula as re-
newed and – on the whole – economically healthy. Model Cities played a
key role in that process.45
From the outset Portland renewal officials linked Model Cities, “a
mayor’s program,” with the city’s larger plans for downtown renewal.
Under the auspices of Senator Edmund Muskie, Portland carved out a
model neighborhood. Portland West, comprising the lion’s share of the
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peninsula, encompassed stately Victorian-era homes and neighbor-
hoods of renter occupied housing strained by suburbanization, disin-
vestment, and poor services. Reborn, this once seedy residential area be-
came the social and economic foundation for revitalization of a new
downtown economy based on banking, insurance, government, and
business services, as well as traditional commerce. Upgrading housing,
health, education, recreation, and police services in Portland West, ar-
gued the city’s Model Cities’ officials, would restore “neighborhood
quality,” boosting the viability of Portland as a whole. This historically
Progressive-Era interpretation of comprehensive civic well-being in-
fused the Model Cities Program in Portland, with its emphasis on the
connection between better housing, improved social services, downtown
renewal, and revitalization of the “city as a whole.”46 While the much
touted experimental housing failed, the Model Cities emphasis on hous-
ing rehabilitation and historic preservation left a deep impression on the
city. Model Cities was all too easily forgotten, but it remains the corner-
stone of the Portland renaissance.
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